The Doctrine of Legitimate Defense by Ohlin, Jens
 
 
Published by the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Doctrine of Legitimate Defense 
 
 
 
 
 
Jens David Ohlin 
 
 
 
 
 
91 INT’L L. STUD. 119 (2015) 
 
 
 
 
Volume 91 2015 
 
 
International Law Studies 2015 
119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Doctrine of Legitimate Defense 
 
 
 
Jens David Ohlin* 
 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
I. Introduction ................................................................................................ 119 
II. The Incorporation of Natural Law in Article 51 ................................... 121 
III. The Proper Scope of Legitimate Defense under Natural Law ............ 128 
A. Natural Law and Self-Preservation ................................................... 128 
B. Conceptual Foundations of Legitimate Defense ............................ 135 
C. Legitimate Defense and Article 51 .................................................... 138 
IV. Legitimate Defense and Humanitarian Intervention ............................ 140 
V. Applying the Doctrine of Legitimate Defense ....................................... 147 
VI. Conclusion................................................................................................... 153 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Contemporary debates surrounding unilateral intervention have rightly 
centered on Article 51 of the UN Charter and its codification of the right 
of self-defense. In the absence of a Security Council authorization or a 
valid Article 51 argument, interventions are deemed illegal—an intolerable 
situation that has triggered several ad hoc attempts to explain or justify 
humanitarian intervention via new or invented exceptions to the Charter 
scheme, including the much-heralded responsibility to protect doctrine.1 
                                                                                                                      
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. 
1. For a good evaluation of these debates, see Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the 
Responsibility to Protect, 48 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 63 (2012). 
 
 
 
The Doctrine of Legitmate Defense                        Vol. 91 
120 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This essay argues that a better solution resides within—not outside—
Article 51 itself. The solution depends on recognizing the great complexity 
of Article 51, especially its explicit incorporation of natural law by reference 
to the droit naturel to légitime défense.2 The effect of this incorporation was to 
preserve and protect, as a carve-out from the prohibition against force 
codified in Article 2 of the Charter, the rights of defensive force that 
applied in natural law (and so continue to be protected by Article 51). This 
is the doctrine of legitimate defense. 
Part II explains in greater detail this dynamic incorporation of natural 
law in Article 51, and, in particular, defends the conclusion that it 
incorporates natural law into the Charter, thus making natural law 
absolutely central to any theory of self-defense that is faithful to the 
article’s text. Part III.A examines the proper scope of defensive rights 
under natural law and concludes that defensive force included, in extreme 
situations, a right of intervention in rogue States that refused to comply 
with natural law in order to “perfect” the intervening State’s right of 
preservation. Part III.B provides a normative foundation for the doctrine 
of legitimate defense by showing how the right of self-determination, the 
right to be free from genocide and the right to self-defense, all flow from a 
more primary right that one might call the right to exist—a right that 
attaches not just to formal States, but also to nations and peoples. 
Although public international lawyers are often uncomfortable discussing 
and relying upon the rights of nations, the universally recognized right of 
self-determination and the right to be free from genocide logically entail 
that non-State entities such as nations and peoples are legally protected by 
existing international law (lex lata). Finally, Part III.C, drawing on an earlier 
work published with George Fletcher, explains how a nation’s right to self-
defense can trigger a third party’s right to intervene on its behalf. The 
textual basis for this claim is that self-defense and other-defense are 
structurally united in the phrase droit naturel to légitime défense for two reasons. 
First, natural law recognized a right of intervention against States that 
violate international law. Second, légitime défense is a criminal law concept 
that includes both self-defense and defense of others. Part IV explains the 
implications of this novel analysis. This reading of Article 51 shows how its 
explicit incorporation of natural law and its reference to legitimate defense 
provides the conceptual grounding for a modern doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, especially once it is recognized that natural law protects 
                                                                                                                      
2. Charte des Nations Unis art. 51. 
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nations and peoples in addition to formal states. More importantly, this 
justification for humanitarian intervention is an interpretation of Article 51 
and is therefore preferable to the responsibility to protect (RTP) or other 
legal doctrines that operate as purported exceptions to the UN Charter and 
thereby weaken its legitimacy. Finally, Part V applies the doctrine of 
legitimate defense to two recent examples to show that it licenses just 
enough force. It is submitted that the NATO intervention in Kosovo was a 
lawful exercise of legitimate defense, consistent with Article 51, to protect 
the ethnic Kosovars, but the Russian covert interventions in Crimea and 
eastern Ukraine do not meet the standards contained in the doctrine. 
 
II. THE INCORPORATION OF NATURAL LAW IN ARTICLE 51 
 
Public international lawyers are generally hostile to natural law. Even 
though natural law has a rich and distinguished history as the moral and 
legal foundation for natural rights, lawyers today get squeamish when the 
doctrinal conversation turns to natural law.3 Bentham famously referred to 
natural rights as “nonsense upon stilts”4 because he denied the existence of 
any natural law that could provide the foundation for these rights. For 
Bentham, the only rights that existed were the positive rights that 
governments enacted in their laws. Although there were prudential reasons 
for the government to make this determination, it could not be called a 
“right” until the government placed the coercive power of the State behind 
it and effectuated its promise. Of course, this positive conception of rights 
runs head first into the rhetoric that activists and litigants use when they 
talk of rights. In situations when governments deny the existence of the 
right in question, litigants do not simply request that the government create 
the right; they demand that the government recognize the right. Recognition 
logically entails that the right is pre-existing, as the phrase “inalienable 
right” in the American Declaration of Independence suggests. Even if the 
government purports to take away the right, the right still exists. This idea 
                                                                                                                      
3. Of course this is not universally true. See W. Michael Reisman, The View from the 
New Haven School of International Law, 86 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
PROCEEDINGS 118, 119 (1992) (“The New Haven School of jurisprudence is an entirely 
secular theory of law but it takes the perspective long associated with natural law, that of 
the decision maker.”). 
4. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchial Fallacies, in NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE 
AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 46, 53 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987). 
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only makes sense if rights have some legitimacy and reality over and above 
their positive enactment by government sources. 
So the key tension here is between natural law and positivism.5 
Although legal positivism has many different flavors and aspects, at least 
one key element of the doctrine is that all law must be written and 
attributable to a specific governmental entity with the authority to issue 
such enactments.6 To find the law, in other words, one must examine a 
piece of written text and identify the source of the text and its specific 
authority to promulgate it.7 This is how one picks out pieces of law from 
non-law in the universe. Although there may be other sources of normative 
authority (e.g., moral or religious norms), the positivist decision-procedure 
allows one to pick out the distinctively legal sources of normativity.8 
Positivism (or at least one strain of it) runs deep among public 
international lawyers, even though if looking from the outside one would 
not expect legal positivism to gain much traction in international law.9  
Why is public international law a surprising fit for legal positivism?10 
Because in addition to treaties and conventions as accepted sources of 
international law, mainstream public international law also includes 
customary law—a feature that is somewhat difficult to integrate into a 
standard definition of legal positivism because customary law is, by 
definition, unwritten in nature.11 That being said, while conceding that 
customary international law is difficult (but not impossible) to integrate 
into a general framework of legal positivism, mainstream public 
                                                                                                                      
5. See ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 228 
(1998). 
6. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGN AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (2007); GODEFRIDUS J.H. HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (1983). 
7. J.L. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1954).  
8. For a more sophisticated version of positivism than Austin, see Joseph Raz, Legal 
Positivism and the Sources of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND 
MORALITY 37 (Joseph Raz ed., 1983). See also MATTHEW H. KRAMER, IN DEFENSE OF 
LEGAL POSITIVISM: LAW WITHOUT TRIMMINGS (1999). 
9. See JEAN D’ASPREMONT, FORMALISM AND THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A THEORY OF ASCERTAINMENT OF LEGAL RULES 25–27 (2011) (describing the 
confusing nature of contemporary debates on legal positivism in international law as 
“unfathomable and unintelligible”). 
10. See Ingo Venzke, Post-modern Perspectives on Orthodox Positivism, in INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL POSITIVISM IN A POST-MODERN WORLD 182, 185 (Jörg Kammerhofer & Jean 
d’Aspremont eds., 2014). 
11. See DENNIS M. PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 96 (1999). 
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international law is largely weighted towards positivistic frames of 
reference.12 By that I mean that international lawyers have a rigid definition 
of what counts as international law, based on a theory of sources that is 
famously expressed in Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
Statute.13 International law can be found in written treaties, decisions of 
international tribunals, general principles of law emanating from national 
legal systems (and therefore positive in nature) and customary international 
law with its relatively clear definition of what counts as custom: 
widespread, consistent, uniform and representative State practice, 
combined with opinio juris.14 Although customary international law is not 
written, it does emanate from a source—the world community of States—
that has the authority under international law to promulgate binding rules 
of law through the process of establishing customary law.15 So it is 
theoretically possible for a legal positivist to accept the legitimacy of 
customary international law without abandoning legal positivism as a 
jurisprudential commitment. In contrast, though, natural law does not 
easily fit within that theory of sources and, consequently, international 
lawyers often denigrate it as “mere morality” or “mere philosophy,” but 
not something that should be dignified with the label “law.”16 
Having explained the deep current of legal positivism that runs through 
public international law, I now wish to question whether international law 
(or any law) can be fully positivistic, by referring to the basic concept of 
self-defense in both its international (jus ad bellum) and domestic (criminal 
law) varieties.17 Self-defense is clearly codified in the domestic criminal law 
                                                                                                                      
12. For a discussion, see Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of 
International Law: Customary International Law and Some of its Problems, 15 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 523 (2004).   
13. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993. 
14. See International Law Association, Final Report of the Committee on the 
Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the 
Formation of General Customary International Law, in REPORT OF THE SIXTY-NINTH 
CONFERENCE 712 (2000). 
15. Indeed, it is interesting to note that Justice Holmes’ description of the positivist 
origins of the common law referred not just to sovereign sources but also quasi-sovereign 
sources. See Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
16. For a discussion, see GIDEON BOAS, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVES 13 (2012). 
17. On the natural law origins of self-defense, see John J. Merriam, Natural Law and 
Self-Defense, 206 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 43 (2010). 
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of every jurisdiction. Similarly, self-defense has always been allowed in 
international law—and necessarily so.18 But imagine a State that decided to 
abolish the justification of self-defense in its criminal law, i.e., a State 
government that, on grounds of pure pacifism, declared that individuals 
could not fight back against illegal and unjustified attacks, even those that 
compromised the bodily integrity or life of the victim. I think it would be 
safe to say that even in that situation, the defender would still have the right 
to defend himself against the unlawful attack because that right cannot be 
taken away from him.19 The domestic legal system is capable of doing a lot 
of things, but taking away the fundamental right of self-defense is not one 
of them.20 Similarly, if the domestic legal system were to codify brutality or 
genocidal treatment, that positive enactment would be overridden by 
natural law. But if that is the case, what is the source of that right?21 The 
source is clearly not the positive enactment of the domestic jurisdiction’s 
penal statute, since the positive law contains no such justification. Indeed, 
the source of the right must pre-date the positive law; it must stand behind 
it. It is, in other words, a principle of natural law that endures even if 
positive law contradicts it. 
Now, the legal positivist might object at this point that the pre-positive 
rights are moral in nature. In other words, the legal positivist might concede 
that it would be wrong for a domestic system to change its law in this 
manner, but the nature of this conclusion would be moral—not legal. The 
only thing that the positivist would deny would be the attachment of the 
word “legal” to the underlying right at issue here. The positivist would say 
that domestic legal systems that fail to recognize the right of self-defense 
are violating the moral rights of the defenders, but not their legal rights. 
The label “legal” is reserved for enactments from the duly authorized 
agents of the government. Of course, the hypothetical debate between the 
legal positivist and the natural lawyer depends in part on the resolution of 
                                                                                                                      
18. The natural law origins are discussed explicitly in DEREK W. BOWETT, SELF-
DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1958). 
19. See Merriam, supra note 17, at 58 (“Self-defense under natural law is unrestrictive 
because, while it can be limited to some extent, it can never be taken away entirely; a law 
that purports to eliminate the right to self-defense would be unjust.”). 
20. Id. 
21. For theorists such as Hobbes, the natural right of self-defense provided the 
conceptual ground for many of the defensive rights that could be asserted in civil society. 
See Claire Finkelstein, Hobbesian Reasoning and Wicked Laws, in HOBBES TODAY: INSIGHTS 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 49, 58 (S.A. Lloyd ed., 2013). 
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the famous Hart-Fuller debate.22 Hart believed that a particular law was 
“law” as long as it was enacted according to a particular procedure (rule of 
recognition) and followed as law (social practice), regardless of whether the 
law was morally just.23 In contrast, Fuller allowed for some considerations 
of moral justice to help determine whether a particular legal enactment 
constituted a law.24 For example, Hart would have viewed Nazi laws as 
immoral but law nonetheless, while Fuller would denied these enactments 
the label “law” since they did not meet minimal standards of morality and 
justice.25  
While these are important jurisprudential debates, I want to argue in 
this essay that the law of self-defense under international law is entirely 
immune from the underlying impulse behind legal positivism. In other 
words, even if one accepts the entirety of Hart’s legal positivism, and 
rejects Fuller’s version of natural law, it would still be the case that the 
structure of the international law of self-defense requires reference to 
natural law. How can this be so? 
The international law of self-defense is governed by Article 51, which 
states that “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”26 The key 
words here are “inherent right;” the idea is that the right of self-defense is 
inherent and pre-exists the positive law. Moreover, the equally authoritative 
French language version of the Charter makes the reference to natural law 
even more sharply: it refers to the “droit naturel de légitime défense.” Both 
“inherent right” and “droit naturel” suggest an explicit reference to natural 
law as defining the proper scope of self-defense.27 
                                                                                                                      
22. See Karen Knop, The Hart-Fuller Debate’s Silence on Human Rights, in THE HART-
FULLER DEBATE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 61 (Peter Cane ed., 2010). 
23. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARVARD LAW 
REVIEW 593 (1958). 
24. See Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARVARD 
LAW REVIEW 630 (1958). 
25. Id. at 633 (“Without any inquiry into the actual workings of whatever remained of 
a legal system under the Nazis, Professor Hart assumes that something must have 
persisted that still deserved the name of law in a sense that would make meaningful the 
ideal of fidelity to law.”). 
26. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
27. For a full explanation of this argument, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID 
OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY (2008). 
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How does this solve the problem of legal positivism? It solves it 
because Article 51 is an example of written authoritative law that satisfies 
whatever amount of legal positivism to which public international lawyers 
are committed. It is a written expression of the law-making authority of the 
States that negotiated, signed and ratified the UN Charter, consistent with 
their authority to make binding international law in the form of a treaty.  
Unless one is a legal positivist who denies the possibility of international 
law and treaties entirely, the Charter is a valid form of written international 
law. What is special about the Charter is that its Article 51 incorporates by 
reference natural law in order to fix the proper contours of self-defense.28 It 
could have established the content of its provision on self-defense in any 
number of ways, but it did it by referring to natural law and incorporating 
its content into the written provision on self-defense. So while Article 51 
articulates the form of self-defense, its content comes from natural law 
according to Article 51 itself. In a sense, natural law becomes positive law 
once it is incorporated into the written provisions of the treaty, although to 
fix the content of its exact source one needs to consult natural law as an 
interpretative guide to what the provision means. 
We can now turn directly to the question of the scope of self-defense 
as defined by the Charter’s positive incorporation of natural law through its 
reference in Article 51. State members of the United Nations are 
prohibited from using force or the threat of force to solve international 
disputes—a prohibition that is codified in Article 2(4).29 This prohibition is 
generally assumed to now transcend its codification in the Charter; it is 
both customary and jus cogens, and applies to non-member States as well.30 
However, the prohibition against force is not universal, because Article 51 
carves out cases of legitimate defense (légitime défense) from the scope of the 
Article 2 prohibition.31 The point of the carve-out is to preserve and 
exempt the natural law of legitimate defense from the general prohibition 
                                                                                                                      
28. The use of natural law to understand Article 51 is rare but not unprecedented in 
contemporary scholarship. See, e.g., William Bradford, “The Duty to Defend Them”: A Natural 
Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1365, 
1430 (2004); Sean D. Magenis, Natural Law as the Customary International Law of Self-Defense, 
20 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 413, 414 (2002). 
29. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 4 
(1963). 
30. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 105 (2011). 
31. FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 27, at 65–72. 
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on the use of force codified in Article 2.32 Indeed, Article 2 gestures 
towards the Article 51 carve-out when it states that “[a]ll Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The 
operative phrase here is “inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations.” Presumably, one purpose of the United Nations is to protect the 
rights identified in the Charter, including the natural right of legitimate 
defense. Article 51 then explicitly carves out the natural right of legitimate 
defense in a way that is entirely consistent with the animating impulse 
behind Article 2(4). More specifically, the United Nations is, among other 
things, an organization dedicated both to international peace and collective 
security, and the right of all member States to engage in legitimate 
defense—unilaterally if necessary—is an essential element of the UN 
Charter’s security regime. Indeed, had the Charter not carved out the 
natural law of self-defense from the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of 
force, the result would have been a near-fatal defect in the burgeoning 
relevance of this fragile international organization. Had the drafters 
required that the Security Council be the exclusive authorization for the use 
of force in all situations, the result would have been that States would have 
exercised their natural right to legitimate defense anyway (rather than face 
destruction), with the consequence that this hypothetical international 
regime would have quickly collapsed as irrelevant and impotent.33  
This analysis suggests two important facts that are sometimes 
overlooked in more conventional analyses of the right to self-defense. First, 
natural law is an essential component in any discussion of the right of self-
defense, because the Charter’s framers decided to anchor their definition of 
self-defense using and incorporating the basic principles of natural law. 
Nor was this a flight of fancy or an odd turn of phrase. It was, instead, a 
perfectly sensible and indeed indispensable policy choice: it was a decision 
to constrain the power of the Charter’s centralized force regime in such a 
                                                                                                                      
32. Other scholars have used the term “carve out” to understand Article 51; the idea 
is not controversial. See, e.g., Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to 
the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 421, 427 (2011). See 
also Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
COMMENTARY 788, 796 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002). 
33. Cf. CHRISTINE D. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 16 (3d 
ed. 2008) (discussing primary but not exclusive authority of the Security Council on use of 
force questions, according to the International Court of Justice). 
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way as to preserve the discretion that natural law conveys upon all victims 
of international aggression to resist their attackers. Had the drafters 
overstepped and negated this natural right, the Charter might have been 
ignored. Instead of negating this natural right, the framers preserved it.34  
Second, none of this runs afoul of modern notions of legal positivism, 
because natural law is not directly part of the law of self-defense; it is 
indirectly part of self-defense through its textual incorporation in the 
language of Article 51. By incorporating and preserving pre-Charter natural 
law, the natural right of self-defense became quasi-textual. However, in 
order to interpret the scope of the textual right, one needs to understand 
natural law. Although this conclusion might be uncomfortable for modern 
positivist international lawyers who dislike natural law, a careful attention 
and fidelity to the treaty’s text requires it. 
 
III. THE PROPER SCOPE OF LEGITIMATE DEFENSE UNDER NATURAL LAW 
 
The next task is to excavate the appropriate scope of legitimate defense 
under natural law—and by extension Article 51. In the following section, I 
argue that the natural law concept of legitimate defense is much broader 
than conventional notions of self-defense. Consequently, this section 
outlines a normative conception of legitimate defense based on the notion 
of self-preservation (including the right of existence) and shows how this 
natural law right is holistically linked to present-day doctrines of self-
defense, the prevention of genocide and self-determination.  
 
A.  Natural Law and Self-Preservation 
 
Natural law theorists writing in the nineteenth century often discussed self-
defense under the rubric of “self-preservation” and the “necessity of self-
                                                                                                                      
34. KINGA TIBORI SZABO, ANTICIPATORY ACTION IN SELF-DEFENCE: ESSENCE 
AND LIMITS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (2011) (“the natural law concept of self-
defense was enshrined in the United Nations Charter”). But see David Kretzmer, The 
Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionality in Jus Ad Bellum, 24 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 235 (2013); Sean Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW 699, 713–14 (2005); William K. Lietzau, Old Laws, New Wars: 
Jus ad Bellum in an Age of Terrorism, 8 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS 
LAW 383, 388 (2004). 
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preservation.”35 This provided the normative ground for the use of military 
force to repel an unjust attack. The basic idea was that countries have a 
right to self-preservation and an outside attack that threatens their 
existence will require them—out of necessity—to use military force to 
preserve their existence.36 For ease of locution I refer to this as the “right 
to exist,” which although not described in this language by natural law 
theorists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, does nonetheless 
capture the essence of self-preservation that grounded their conception of 
self-defense. Given the fundamental nature of the right to self-
preservation, the right was not subject to rescission by positive law. It is 
indelible and inalienable. Its source was—and remains—natural law. 
For example, Christian Wolff characteristically argued that “man is 
bound to preserve himself by nature” and that “likewise the right of 
defending one’s self again the injuries of others belongs to man by nature, 
and the law of nature itself assigns it to a nation.”37  Similarly, Vattel argued 
that all States, just like all individuals, have the right to preserve themselves 
under natural law:  
 
The right of employing force, or making war, belongs to nations no 
farther than is necessary for their own defence, and for the maintenance 
of their rights. Now, if any one attacks a nation, or violates her perfect 
rights, he does her an injury. Then, and not till then, that nation has a 
right to repel the aggressor, and reduce him to reason. Further, she has a 
right to prevent the intended injury, when she sees herself threatened 
with it.38  
 
                                                                                                                      
35. Fenwick concludes that the term “self-preservation” fell out of favor around 
1920. See C.G. Fenwick, Book Review, 41 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 936 (1928) (reviewing 
BRUCE WILLIAMS, STATE SECURITY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1927)).  
36. See Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally Wrongful Conduct, 
3 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT LAW JOURNAL 1, 4 (2000) (“Necessity, it 
seems, was from long ago coupled with the notion of self-preservation. That is to say, 
when a threat to self-preservation arose, it was considered justified to take any steps 
necessary to preserve one's existence, even if such steps would have been unlawful had 
they been taken in the absence of a threat to self-preservation.”). 
37. See CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM § 
3, at 9–10 (Joseph H. Drake trans., Oxford University Press 1934) (1764).   
38. See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 
ch. III § 26, at 301 (Joseph Chitty ed., T. & J. W. Johnson, Law Booksellers 1844) (1758). 
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Wheaton held a similar view and explicitly referred to the right of self-
defense as the right of self-preservation: “Of the absolute international 
rights of States, one of the most essential and important, and that which 
lies at the foundation of all the rest, is the right of self preservation.”39 This 
includes subsidiary rights of which the most important is the notion of self-
defense. As Wheaton explained,  
 
“[i]n the exercise of these means of defence, no independent State can be 
restricted by any foreign power. But another nation may, by virtue of its 
won right of self-preservation, if it sees in these preparations an occasion 
for alarm, or if it anticipates any possible danger of aggression, demand 
explanations . . . .40 
 
Indeed, the right of self-preservation was so central to the natural law 
conception of self-defense that natural law theorists regarded it not simply 
as a right but also a duty. Wheaton recognized this when he wrote that self-
preservation “is not only a right with respect to other States, but a duty 
with respect to its own members, and the most solemn and important 
which the State owes to them.”41 It might sound odd to think of self-
preservation as not only a right but also a duty, but, in fact, this 
conceptualization was common under natural law and essential to 
understanding its broader impact with regard to the doctrine of military 
intervention. Nor was Wheaton alone in using the language of duty to refer 
to self-preservation. For example, Wolff referred to self-preservation not 
only as a right but also a duty because “every nation is bound to preserve 
itself.”42 This includes “averting the danger of destruction.”43 Specifically, 
Wolff concluded that “[t]he right belongs to every nation to defend itself 
and its right against another nation. For the right belongs to everybody. 
Therefore, since the same right is to be applied to nations also, the right 
belongs to every nation also to defend itself against another nation.”44  
In these comments one can see how the duty to preserve oneself is 
intimately linked to the duty to ensure the perfection of other States as well.  
This notion goes back at least as far back as Vattel, who concluded that “a 
                                                                                                                      
39. See HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW pt. II, ch. I, at 86 
(6th ed. 1855). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. WOLFF, supra note 37, § 273, at 139. 
43. Id. 
44 Id. 
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nation must not simply confine itself to preserving itself but must also 
pledge itself to the preservation (and perfection) of other nations as well.”45 
This suggests that the silo of sovereignty, which so often animates current 
international law thinking, was weaker under the natural law theorists. As a 
result, self-preservation in its broadest sense included not just repelling an 
outside attack, but also pro-actively intervening externally in foreign States 
whose behavior was inconsistent with basic principles of natural law. For 
example, Hall argued that “intervention” in foreign States was justified on 
grounds of “self-preservation.”46 This shows that the current dichotomy 
between self-defense and foreign intervention was not present, at least not 
in its current starkness, in the natural law realm. Indeed, Hall wrote 
specifically that “interventions for the purpose of self-preservation 
naturally include all those which are grounded upon danger to the 
institutions, to the good order, or to the external safety of the intervening 
state.”47 Intervention was consistently defended by natural lawyers.48 
                                                                                                                      
45. VATTEL, supra note 38, at 136. 
46. See WILLIAM E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. VII (1880). 
47. Id., § 91, at 242. Also, Hall includes a lengthy discussion of intervention during a 
civil war at the behest of one party to the conflict: “It is generally said, and the statement is 
of course open to no question, that intervention may take place at the invitation of both 
parties to a civil war.” See id., pt. II, ch. VIII, § 94, at 249.  
48. See, e.g., 2 HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE ch. CCV, pt. 
VIII(1) (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901) (1625) (concluding that governments lose “the rights 
of independent sovereigns,” their right to be free from outside interference, and the 
“privilege of the law of nations” when they “provoke their people to despair and 
resistance by unheard of cruelties”); VATTEL, supra note 38, ch. IV, § 54 (permitting 
intervention in support of oppressed populations); SAMUEL PUFFENDORF, DE JURE 
NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO bk. VIII, ch. 6, § 14 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. 
Oldfather trans., 1934) (1688). In a series of important articles, Evan Criddle (alone and 
collaborating with Evan Fox-Decent) has shown that this fiduciary relationship is not just 
a relic of the natural law past but is, rather, a foundational concept for today’s 
international legal order. See especially Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary 
Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 331, 334 (2009) 
(discussing the fiduciary model of State sovereignty and concluding that “[e]ven after 
natural law theory fell into disrepute in the nineteenth century with the rise of legal 
positivism, the classical notion of peremptory law continued to influence international 
legal theory well into the modern era”); Evan J. Cirddle, Standing for Human Rights Abroad, 
100 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 269, 302 (2015) (discussing the “parent-child” analogy in 
Grotius to ground a general theory of countermeasures in contemporary international 
law); Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J. Criddle, The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights, 15 
LEGAL THEORY 301 (2009) (describing the State-subject relationship regulated by human 
rights law as a “fiduciary relationship”). 
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One might argue that although natural law recognized a broad right of 
external intervention under the rubric of self-preservation and the duty to 
perfect that right in other States, this basic scheme was upended by the 
adoption of the UN Charter with its duty to refrain from using force under 
Article 2 and its very limited right of self-defense codified in Article 51. 
Some scholars act as if this transformation occurred almost 
instantaneously, a veritable “Grotian moment” where the legal norms 
quickly solidified.49 If this transformation happened rapidly, one could 
point as its inspiration to the horrors of World War II, the dangers of 
aggressive war (by Germany and Japan) and the need to avoid a repeat of 
this scarring international experience. 
 But there is little evidence of such a Grotian moment. Indeed, the 
broader natural law right of intervention was still very much in evidence in 
the early days after the adoption of the UN Charter when the horrors of 
World War II were still fresh in memory. For example, Hersch 
Lauterpacht’s seventh edition of Oppenheim’s International Law, published in 
1948, still couches the right of intervention in the form of self-
preservation: “From the earliest time of the existence of the Law of 
Nations self-preservation was considered sufficient justification for many 
acts of a State which violate other States.”50 Lauterpacht also argued that 
“[o]nly such acts of violence in the interest of self-preservation are excused 
as are necessary in self-defence, because otherwise the acting State would 
have to suffer, or have to continue to suffer, a violation against itself.”51  
The discussion of “self-preservation” is not simply a holdover from 
Oppenheim’s earlier editions that Lauterpacht did not revisit. In fact, 
Lauterpact specifically announced in the preface to the seventh edition that 
the treatise was revised after the adoption of the UN Charter and that its 
content takes into account these developments since “[t]here would be no 
justification for neglecting, in a treatise of this kind, an account of these 
                                                                                                                      
49. Cf. DAN KUWALI, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF 
ARTICLE 4(H) INTERVENTION 58 (2010) (referring without necessarily endorsing the view 
that “[w]ith this proscription in the UN Charter under Article 2(4), the custom of 
‘humanitarian intervention,’ if it could still be considered a valid practice, was now 
abrogated”). The term “Grotian moment” comes from Falk. See Richard A. Falk, The 
Grotian Moment: Unfulfilled Promise, Harmless Fantasy, Missed Opportunity? 13 INTERNATIONAL 
INSIGHTS 3 (1997). 
50. See 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE ch. V, § 129 
(Hersch Lauterpacht, 7th ed. 1948).  
51. Id., § 130, at 266. 
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developments.”52 In the text of the treatise, Lauterpacht explains how the 
right of self-preservation is connected with the carve-out of in Article 51: 
“Thus the Charter of the United Nations leaves intact the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence in case of armed attack against a 
member of the United Nations until the Security Council takes action.”53  
Is this notion consistent with military intervention?  Yes, Lauterpacht 
recognized that it could be consistent with the right of self-preservation. 
The treatise notes seven reasons for intervention, including: “If a State in 
time of peace or war violate such rules of the Law of Nations as are 
universally recognized by custom or are laid down in law-making treaties, 
other States have a right to intervene and to make the delinquent submit to 
the rules concerned.”54 His views in this regard are evidence that the 
natural law origins of self-defense, under the broader notion of self-
preservation, endured well into the era of the UN Charter.  
This broader notion of self-preservation, which Lauterpacht argued 
was consistent with Article 51, connects the natural law notion of self-
preservation with modern doctrines of intervention. To summarize the 
argument, the Charter by its explicit terms preserves the natural law right 
of self-defense. Under natural law, self-defense was conceptualized in 
terms of self-preservation, not only as a right but also as a duty. The duty 
extended not just to preserving one’s own existence, but also perfecting that 
right both for oneself and others. This provided for the right of 
intervention against States acting contrary to international legal norms. In 
short, natural law included an implicit doctrine of intervention for the 
benefit of third parties that was subsumed under the doctrine of self-
preservation. This fact was not lost on Lauterpacht who also argued that 
intervention “is generally directed only against a party within the state, or 
against a particular form of state life, and it is frequently carried out in the 
interest of the government or of persons belonging to the invaded state.”55 
In other words, it was understood even in the emerging United Nations era 
that intervention on behalf of a foreign party was part of the doctrine of 
self-preservation. And it is that right which was preserved by Article 51 and 
its carve-out from the Article 2 prohibition on the use of force. 
Impoverished interpretations of Article 51 that ignore its natural law 
origins produce an erroneously narrow view of defensive force. Moreover, 
                                                                                                                      
52. Id. at v (preface to the seventh edition). 
53. Id., § 130, at 267. 
54. Id., § 135, at 276. 
55. Id., ch. VIII, §  88, at 240. 
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this ignorance of natural law is unjustified even on textualist and positivist 
grounds, since Article 51 by its bare terms incorporates by reference the 
right as it existed under natural law. 
As a conceptual matter, one might argue that the right of legitimate 
defense belongs to nations instead of States. Since the right of legitimate 
defense emanates from natural law, and States qua States are creatures of 
positive law, then there must be some notion of legitimate defense that 
existed even if there was no international system to confer recognition on 
States. Think of the point this way: even if the world collapsed into pure 
anarchy, the right of self-defense would still exist since it is a creature of 
natural law. Even in the absence of formal State recognition, the right 
would attach to some other more primary unit of analysis, such as nations 
and peoples. This would entail a right of intervention on behalf of nations 
and peoples (including oppressed minorities) seeking to exercise their rights 
of self-preservation.   
However, the natural law theorists would not have expressed the right 
of intervention using the language of nations and peoples. Although they 
recognized the distinction between nations and States,56 their doctrine of 
intervention was based on a broad reading of self-preservation and the duty 
to perfect that right as it attached to other States. They were not likely to use 
the language of “nation” and “people” to describe the entities on whose 
behalf intervention was permitted. They were more likely to simply assert 
that the intervening State was perfecting the right of the target State (even 
if that intervention was contrary to the wishes of the established 
government of the target State). With that being said, as a normative matter 
the concept of nations and peoples offers a more conceptually satisfying 
rubric with which to express the natural law right of intervention. In the 
following section, I explain how contemporary international law already 
implicitly recognizes the right of nations and peoples to exist, and, 
therefore, the broad reading of the natural law of self-preservation is 
entirely consistent with the current trajectory of positive international 
law—which offers substantial protection to these entities. 
 
                                                                                                                      
56. Wheaton understood that States and nations were separate. See WHEATON, supra 
note 39, at 27 (“A State is also distinguishable from a Nation, since the former may be 
composed of different races of men, all subject to the same supreme authority. Thus the 
Austrian, Prussian and Ottoman empires, are each composed of a variety of nations and 
people.”). 
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B. Conceptual Foundations of Legitimate Defense 
 
The right to exist provides the normative foundation for other rights in 
international law that are often thought of as separate and conceptually 
distinct from self-defense, such as protection from genocide and self-
determination. But if one scrutinizes these concepts, it becomes clear that 
the latter two are both positive expressions of—and vindications of—the 
natural law concept of self-preservation and the right to exist. 
The most obvious example here is genocide, which involves the right 
of protected groups to be free from existential threat. The underlying 
impulse of the law of genocide is that the group itself is deserving of 
protection, not just the underlying individuals who make up the group. 
Although this point is often confused, the underlying predicate offenses in 
the Genocide Convention (as well as the relevant statutes of the ad hoc 
tribunals) include predicate offenses that do not involve the killing of the 
group members.57 These predicate offenses include forcibly transferring 
children from one group to another, imposing measures intended to 
prevent births and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. These 
elements target the destruction of the group itself—as opposed to the 
human beings who make up the group—and declare them illegal.58 The law 
of genocide is based on the idea that some groups are deserving of 
protection and that an attack against their existence is a fundamental 
breach of international law. 
As for which groups are protected by the law of genocide, the 
Convention protects national, ethnical, racial and religious groups. There 
has been some discussion of whether the list is under-inclusive and 
whether political groups should be included.59 That discussion is important, 
but not one that needs to be resolved here. The important point is that 
national groups—not just States—are protected by the law of genocide. 
Even if a group does not constitute a formal State, its right to exist is 
preserved by the law of genocide and an existential attack against it 
                                                                                                                      
57. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, 
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
58. See WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF 
CRIMES 236 (2000). See also LARRY MAY, GENOCIDE: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT 65 (2010). 
59. See DAVID L. NERSESSIAN, GENOCIDE AND POLITICAL GROUPS 177 (2010). 
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constitutes a jus cogens violation.60 The lesson to be drawn from this fact is 
that the right to exist under natural law is not limited to formal States, it 
also includes—at the very least—State-like entities such as nations that do 
not have formal recognition under positive international law. Their inability 
to be recognized under international law does not prevent them from being 
protected by the law of genocide—a positive law outgrowth of the 
underlying natural right to self-preservation. 
It should be obvious by now why the law of genocide is linked to the 
natural law right to exist. Although the Genocide Convention was not 
drafted until 1948, and the term genocide did not exist until Raphael 
Lemkin coined the term in 1944,61 the idea that a national group is free 
from existential attack is now hardwired into our thinking. Indeed, consider 
what the state of the law would be if the Genocide Convention was 
repealed and enough State parties signed a treaty declaring that genocide 
was permissible. The result of such a declaration would be nugatory. One 
way of expressing the point is that the prohibition against genocide is jus 
cogens and non-derogable, regardless of what the Genocide Convention 
says.62 But the question is why it is jus cogens and why the international 
community is not in a position to permit existential attacks against national 
groups. The only coherent answer is that the prohibition against genocide 
is linked to a more fundamental right—the right to exist—that supervenes 
over treaty-based law. It comes from natural law. 
Under natural law, the right to exist should be attributed to nations and 
peoples—not to States. There are two major pieces of evidence for this 
proposition. The first is that the right to be free from genocidal attack is 
not attributed to States, but rather to national and ethnic groups regardless 
of whether they form a State or not. Indeed, most of the urgent cases of 
genocide in the past century have involved cultural or national groups that 
did not have their own State (e.g., Tutsis who shared a State with Hutus, 
and Jews who lived in Germany and the rest of Europe prior to the 
creation of Israel). Indeed, the ethnic violence in the Balkans involved 
national groups inside Bosnia and Kosovo; the groups that are protected by 
                                                                                                                      
60. See CAROLINE FOURNET, THE CRIME OF DESTRUCTION AND THE LAW OF 
GENOCIDE 99 (2013). 
61. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE (1944). 
62. For a discussion of the jus cogens nature of genocide, see Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serbia & 
Montenegro), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 441 (Sept. 13) (separate opinion of Lauterpacht, J. ad hoc). 
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the law of genocide are untethered from a formalistic conception of States 
as the exclusive units of international law. 
The second piece of evidence is the right of self-determination. This 
right, even under positive international law, is attributed to nations and 
peoples.63 It cannot be attributed simply to States otherwise it would be 
utterly vacuous. The concept of self-determination does not simply 
preserve the right of States to exist as States, which would only preserve 
the status quo and nothing else. Rather, the right of self-determination is 
the right of a nation or a people to exercise meaningful self-determination 
in the form of self-government.64 In some cases that right takes the form of 
internal self-determination (through meaningful participation in a larger 
political unit) or external self-determination (through the creation of a 
separate and new State specifically designed to vindicate the right of self-
determination). There are important debates in the literature over when 
negative conditions trigger external self-determination and a right to 
remedial secession; for the moment those debates can be set aside. The 
important point is that the right of self-determination is not a right that 
belongs to States exclusively—it belongs to nations and peoples.  
We now have explored two rights under international law that are 
afforded to national groups: the right to be free from genocide and the 
right to self-determination. In a sense, this should not be surprising, 
because the underlying natural law right, the right to exist, belongs to 
national groups regardless of whether or not they are recognized as formal 
States under our system of international law. I now want to extend the 
analysis one step further and suggest that the right of legitimate defense, 
since it is an expression of this deeper right to self-preservation under 
natural law, also belongs to national groups that do not constitute a State. 
For some positivist international lawyers, this step in the argument 
might go one step too far; but the argument is sound. Remember, the 
structure of the UN Charter provides for a prohibition against the use of 
force against member States, which is extended by custom and jus cogens to 
all States. Article 51 then carves out from that prohibition the natural law 
right of legitimate defense, which is preserved in spite of the Article 2 
prohibition on the use of force. Since the content of that right is provided 
                                                                                                                      
63. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL 
APPRAISAL (1998). 
64. Cf. Per Sevastik, Secession, Self-determination of “Peoples” and Recognition—The Case of 
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence and International Law, in LAW AT WAR: THE LAW AS IT WAS 
AND THE LAW AS IT SHOULD BE 231, 235 (Ola Engdahl & Pal Wrange eds., 2008). 
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by natural law, if natural law preserves the right of national groups to 
protect themselves, then this right is preserved by Article 51. Furthermore, 
there is nothing in Article 2 that—by its terms—applies the prohibition 
against the use of force to national groups anyway.  It is States that are 
prohibited from using force. But even if the Article 2 prohibition applies to 
national groups that remain stateless, the Article 51 carve-out preserves 
those rights that they have under natural law. 
 
C. Legitimate Defense and Article 51 
 
Now comes time to outline the exact contours of the right of legitimate 
defense under Article 51. This requires careful attention not just to natural 
law, but also to the bare text of Article 51, which is often overlooked. The 
English language version of the Charter refers to the inherent right of self-
defense, individual or collective. In addition, the French language version 
of the Charter refers to the “droit naturel de légitime défense.”65 The phrase 
légitime défense refers to the continental notion of legitimate defense that one 
finds in the criminal law of jurisdictions such as France,66 Germany or 
Spain, as well as the legal systems that draw their inspiration from them.67 
American and British common law jurisdictions often have one penal law 
provision for self-defense, one for defense of others and possibly a third 
                                                                                                                      
65. The phrase legitimate defense also appears in the Spanish language version of the 
UN Charter. See Carta de les Naciones Unidas art. 51 (“legitima defensa, individual o collectiva”). 
66. French criminal law provides that “[n]’est pas pénalement responsable la personne 
qui, devant une atteinte injustifiée envers elle-même ou autrui, accomplit, dans le même 
temps, un acte commandé par la nécessité de la légitime défense d'elle-même ou d'autrui, 
sauf s'il y a disproportion entre les moyens de défense employés et la gravité de l'atteinte.” 
See CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 122-5. 
67. For example, Swiss criminal law is influenced by German criminal law. Section 15 
of the Swiss criminal code is titled “legitimate defense” and states that “[i]f any person is 
unlawfully attacked or threatened with imminent attack, the person attacked and any other 
person are entitled to ward off the attack by means that are reasonable in the 
circumstances.” See SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB], CODE PÉNAL SUISSE 
[CP], CODICE PENALE SVIZZERO [CP] [CRIMINAL CODE] Dec. 21, 1937, SR 311.0, art. 15  
(unofficial English government translation available at http://www.admin.ch/ 
ch/e/rs/3/311.0.en.pdf). In German, the provision is titled “Rechtfertigende Notwehr” 
and states that “[w]ird jemand ohne Recht angegriffen oder unmittelbar mit einem Angriff 
bedroht, so ist der Angegriffene und jeder andere berechtigt, den Angriff in einer den 
Umständen angemessenen Weise abzuwehren.” 
 
International Law Studies 2015 
139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for defense of property.68 In contrast, civil law jurisdictions, using an 
economy of words, simply roll up everything into one notion of legitimate 
defense which allows any individual to use appropriate and necessary force 
to repel an unlawful attack against himself or a third party (what a common 
law lawyer would refer to as defense of others). Of course, the defensive 
force must be necessary in order to repel the attack and it must not be 
disproportionate. For this reason, the German Penal Code uses the term 
Notwehr, or necessary defense.69 In general, the concept of legitimate 
defense rolls together self-defense and defense of others under a broader 
notion of legitimate defense. 
It is striking that the French and Spanish versions of the UN Charter 
use this broader locution to express the defensive force concept in Article 
51. Was this a deliberate choice on the part of the drafters to codify both 
self-defense and defense of others within the same provision of Article 51? 
Many lawyers will be tempted to argue that the drafting process and 
negotiations were inevitably conducted in English, with translations that 
were developed at the final stage of the process. This argument would 
suggest that the English language version, through technically co-equal in 
weight with the other official language versions, should receive priority as a 
hermeneutical manner because of its status as a lingua franca. Although this 
is a plausible argument, it assumes that the different negotiators were fully 
aware that each State party involved in the drafting process was working 
with a unified and coherent set of legal concepts—the English language 
ones—and that they came to an agreement using the underlying common 
law concepts. Rather, it is much more likely that Article 51 was 
incompletely theorized, i.e., that it was designed to preserve the inherent 
right of self-defense in the absence of Security Council authorization, with 
                                                                                                                      
68. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 3.04 (self), § 3.05 (others), § 3.06 (property), § 3.07 
(law enforcement) (1962).  
69. See STRAFGESETZBUCH (STGB) [PENAL CODE], May 15, 1871 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 583, § 32 (“Notwehr: (1) Wer eine Tat begeht, die durch 
Notwehr geboten ist, handelt nicht rechtswidrig. (2) Notwehr ist die Verteidigung, die 
erforderlich ist, um einen gegenwärtigen rechtswidrigen Angriff von sich oder einem 
anderen abzuwenden.”). In English, the provision provides that “(1) A person who 
commits an act of necessary defense does not act unlawfully. (2) Necessary defense means 
any defensive action that is necessary to avert an imminent unlawful attack on oneself or 
another.” One could also translate Notwehr as “legitimate defense.” The advantage of the 
phrase “necessary defense” is that it explains and evokes the historical and conceptual 
relationship between justifications appealing to defensive force and defenses based on the 
principle of necessity. 
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little to no common agreement about when and how that right would be 
applied.70 That was a retained ambiguity necessary for the agreement to be 
completed. And this ambiguity was magnified by the fact that different 
State parties came from different legal cultures in which the concept of 
defensive force is carved up in fundamentally different ways. In some 
jurisdictions, defense of others is part of legitimate defense, rather than 
separate from it. Nothing in the language of Article 51 excludes this 
interpretation.71  
This is the major doctrinal payoff of recognizing the broader natural 
law genesis of Article 51: it provides an argument in favor of outside 
intervention in much the same way as responsibility to protect does. 
However, the legitimate defense doctrine does not provide an omnibus 
argument in favor of intervention in any situation when the results would 
be otherwise disastrous. The argument allows for intervention in only a few 
select situations based on the outer contours of the concept itself.  
 
IV. LEGITIMATE DEFENSE AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
 
In the present Part, I first outline the criteria for exercising legitimate 
defense and show how the doctrine can provide a legal foundation for 
humanitarian intervention in select cases. Also, I argue that humanitarian 
intervention as justified by the doctrine of legitimate defense is preferable 
to the doctrine of responsibility to protect, the other leading contender for 
providing a legal foundation for humanitarian intervention. 
The doctrine of legitimate defense provides a foundation for 
humanitarian intervention because it carves out from the Article 2 
prohibition on the use of force not only self-defense, but also defense of 
others, which also falls under the rubric of legitimate defense. Drawing on 
principles of self-defense articulated in criminal law, the criteria for defense 
of others maps on exactly to the criteria for self-defense. As the natural law 
publicists clearly articulated, natural law protected the right of each 
individual human being to exercise force on his or her behalf, and this 
same principle applied in natural law to the exercise of force between 
                                                                                                                      
70. For a discussion of the negotiations, see RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 698–99 (1958). 
71. Cf. Josef Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, 41 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 872, 875 (1947) 
(discussing continental notions of defensive force from domestic criminal law during 
analysis of defensive force under public international law).  
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collective groups. If an individual victim of an aggressor is entitled to use 
force in the exercise of his or her self-defense, other individuals are entitled 
to use force on their behalf as well. Indeed, it would be incoherent under 
criminal law to assert that an individual victim of aggression is entitled to 
use defensive force, but then deny that third parties may use force while 
coming to their defense.72 This is the whole point of referring to defensive 
force as a justification as opposed to an excuse.73 Since justifications are 
general in nature and negate the wrongfulness of the act, it stands to reason 
that the justified actor engaging in defensive force has performed no 
wrongful action in defending himself. If the action itself is not wrongful, 
then third parties are entitled—by logical extension—to come to the aid of 
the original victim.74 In this way, justifications always flow down to third 
parties, who by definition receive the benefits of the original actor’s 
justification. Excuses, by contrast, do not flow down to third parties.75 
Since the basic structure of the natural right of legitimate defense stems 
from criminal law (it was developed by analogy in international law based on 
its original application in criminal law),76 the same analysis applies to 
legitimate defense as exercised by nations. Consequently, a group’s right to 
use defensive force on its behalf corresponds exactly with the right of third 
parties to exercise force on their behalf as well. 
At this point, the doctrinal consequences of the argument are non-
controversial. No one seriously doubts that States can come to the aid of 
third-party States that are attacked.77 The more controversial question is 
whether the concept of defense of others that is implicitly contained within 
legitimate defense can ground a doctrine of humanitarian intervention.78 I 
argue here that it can because the right belongs to national groups 
                                                                                                                      
72. See Marcia Baron, Gender Issues in Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 335, 355 (John Deigh & ‎David Dolinko eds., 2011). 
73. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (Oxford reprint 2010) 
(1978). 
74. But see Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1897 (1984). 
75. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 143 (1998). 
76. For an older discussion of international law that made frequent reference to 
criminal law categories, see BOWETT, supra note 18, at 65. 
77. See David K. Linnan, Self-Defense, Necessity, and U.N. Collective Security: United States 
and Other Views, 1 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (1991). 
78. For a general discussion of the legality of humanitarian intervention, see SEAN D. 
MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING 
WORLD ORDER (1996). 
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regardless of whether or not the national group constitutes a State. In other 
words, if a national group located within a sovereign State is attacked, and 
that attack threatens their natural law right to exist, the national group has a 
right, sounding in natural law, to resist that unjustified attack. By extension, 
other nations have the right to come to the assistance of that national 
group through the exercise of the defense of others that is implicit in the 
doctrine of legitimate defense. And it is precisely this broader natural law 
right that is carved out of the prohibition against the use of force by Article 
51. Other nations can intervene, even over the objection of the host State, 
because natural law protects the right of national groups to exercise self-
preservation. This generates a right of unilateral intervention that falls 
under the rubric of the Article 51 carve-out from the prohibition against 
the use of force. 
Some will object at this point that there is insufficient evidence that this 
right of legitimate defense should be attributed to nations or peoples. 
Lawyers working within a Westphalian framework of international law will 
insist that the right of self-defense is afforded to existing States only and 
that non-States, even groups that are best described as nations or peoples, 
have no rights of defense protected by the UN Charter.79 This view is 
doctrinaire and mainstream, but it is wrong. There are several reasons why. 
First, if self-defense only applies to States, then it would be an outlier, since 
the other international rights which are most closely connected to it—the 
right to self-determination and the right to be free from genocide—apply 
to national groups, not just States. So in that respect, reserving the concept 
of self-defense to States would be an anachronism. Second, States are 
creatures of positive law, of the legal doctrines that structure the 
relationship of State recognition. Nations are not exactly natural kinds in 
nature,80 but they are entities that exist regardless of whether positive law 
recognizes their political and social organizations as legal persons under the 
                                                                                                                      
79. For an example of strict interpretation of the right to self-defense, see the 
discussion in Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 839 (2001) (discussing limits on the right of self-
defense and the conclusion of European public international lawyers that the U.S. use of 
force against the Taliban after 9/11 was illegal). 
80. See ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 47 (2008) (“Nations are not 
inscribed into the nature of things, they do no constitute a political version of the doctrine 
of natural kinds. Nor were national states the manifest ultimate destiny of ethnic or 
cultural groups. What do exist are cultures, often subtly grouped, shading into each other, 
overlapping, intertwined; and there exist, usually but not always, political units of all 
shapes and sizes.”). 
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international legal system. The right to exist, which finds expression in the 
rights of self-preservation, freedom from existential genocide and self-
determination, is a right that is attributed to nations regardless of whether 
they constitute a State in the formal sense of that term. To claim otherwise 
is to deny the natural law right its rightful significance. Natural law predates 
the formation of our Westphalian system of States, and therefore some 
rights existing under natural law must attach to entities that endure even in 
the absence of the formal superstructure of State existence. 
If we recognize that there exists a natural law doctrine of legitimate 
defense, then some traditional elements of self-defense should fall by the 
wayside. For example, the ICJ’s Nicaragua decision argued that outside 
intervention on behalf of a victim required a formal request of assistance 
from the beleaguered victim of unlawful aggression.81 However, this 
requirement was constructed from whole cloth; nothing regarding it 
appears in the UN Charter. While it is clear that customary law prohibits 
pretextual uses of force—using military assistance as a cover for colonizing 
a victim of third-party aggression—there is no reason to think that a formal 
request for assistance is required to engage in defense of others.82 Indeed, it 
potentially creates perverse incentives and rewards bad behavior: if an 
outside force completely destroys a State and its government before a 
request for assistance can be tendered, then outside intervention is 
disallowed simply because the victim does not retain the formal political 
structure to issue it. 
Indeed, the doctrine of legitimate defense entails that a formal request 
for assistance is unnecessary because in some situations, the beleaguered 
party might be a national group that has no formal political structure for 
making requests of assistance. If we reject the idea that the only formal 
entities capable of legitimate defense are States, then we must also reject 
the equally State-centric view that some kind of formal political request is 
                                                                                                                      
81. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 199 (June 27) (“At all events, the Court finds that in customary international 
law, whether of a general kind or that particular to the inter-American system, there is no 
rule permitting the exercise of collective self-defence in the absence of a request by the 
State which regards itself as the victim of an armed attack. The Court concludes that the 
requirement of a request by the State which is the victim of the alleged attack is additional 
to the requirement that such a State should have declared itself to have been attacked.”). 
82. Indeed, concerns about pretextual claims are implicit in any scheme regarding the 
use of force, though they are particularly acute in the context of humanitarian 
intervention. For a discussion, see JOSHUA JAMES KASSNER, RWANDA AND THE MORAL 
OBLIGATION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 159 (2013). 
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required before outside parties can render their assistance. Indeed, it would 
seem absurd to suggest that the Tutsis in Rwanda could not be defended 
simply because they had no political structure to issue an official and de 
jure request for assistance. 
The doctrine of legitimate defense provides a more legally satisfying 
foundation for humanitarian intervention than the responsibility to protect, 
a legal doctrine that asserts that outside intervention is permissible to 
protect civilian populations from widespread human rights disasters.83 The 
problem with the RTP doctrine is that it is mostly an exercise in wishful 
thinking. Proponents of the doctrine argue that it was crafted by an 
international commission, at the behest of the United Nations, after the 
Kosovo intervention was widely viewed as both illegal under international 
law and morally legitimate—a tension that required some sort of revision. 
Either international law needed to be tweaked or the international 
community needed to concede that international law was, stubbornly, 
immoral.  
The result was the RTP commission and its widely heralded report.84 
Unfortunately, it is an exaggeration to give the commission the imprimatur 
of the United Nations. The commission was a creature of the Canadian 
government, not the United Nations, although its members were individuals 
from around the world, and it had taken up the challenge noted by Kofi 
Anan, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, to resolve the 
humanitarian intervention paradox. What of the much-heralded “adoption” 
of the RTP report by the General Assembly? That resolution simply urged 
the Security Council to take action to protect civilian populations.85 The 
                                                                                                                      
83. For a general canvassing of relevant doctrines regarding intervention, see Mary 
Ellen O’Connell, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 9–10 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013). 
84. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001). 
85. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 
16, 2005) ¶ 139 (“The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in 
accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are 
prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis 
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful 
means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We 
stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to 
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resolution said absolutely nothing about the most aggressive aspect of the 
RTP doctrine: the alleged unilateral right of all nations to intervene 
militarily to stop a crisis in the absence of Security Council authorization. In 
fact, the resolution emphasized the need for action within the Security 
Council framework. Indeed, the doctrine itself is fundamentally vague; it 
includes the notion of unilateral intervention, but also the much thinner 
notion that the international community has a diffuse duty to lessen the 
impact of war that falls on innocent civilians. That fundamental ambiguity 
to RTP—does it mean something trite or tectonic—has allowed the 
doctrine to flourish because at each moment that someone endorses it no 
one really knows which version is being supported.86  
The bigger problem with the RTP doctrine, in its tectonic variation, is 
that it represents an exception to the UN Charter that falls outside the scope 
of its provisions on the use of force.87 This is a problem not just for RTP, 
but for all arguments of humanitarian intervention that couch themselves 
as exceptions to the Articles 2 and 51 framework. Even Cassese, writing in 
his famous European Journal of International Law article regarding Kosovo in 
1999, declared that humanitarian intervention might emerge, through 
custom, as an exception to the general framework established by the UN 
Charter that force is only permitted via a Security Council authorization or 
Article 51.88 But what does it mean to call this general framework an 
                                                                                                                      
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and 
international law.”). 
86. See, e.g., Ban Ki-Moon, U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks at Berlin Event 
“Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World” (July 15, 
2008), which are vague about whether RTP allows for unilateral intervention (“Properly 
understood, RtoP is an ally of sovereignty, not an adversary. Strong States protect their 
people, while weak ones are either unwilling or unable to do so. Protection was one of the 
core purposes of the formation of States and the Westphalian system. By helping States 
meet one of their core responsibilities, RtoP seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not weaken 
it.”). 
87. See Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International 
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1999).  
88. Id. at 29 (“However, if one takes into account the premise of that forcible action 
and the particular conditions surrounding it, the following contention may be warranted: 
this particular instance of breach of international law may gradually lead to the 
crystallization of a general rule of international law authorizing armed countermeasure for 
the exclusive purpose or putting an end to large-scale atrocities amounting to crimes 
against humanity and constituting a threat to the peace. Such a rule, should it eventually 
evolve in the world community, would constitute an exception to the UN Charter system of 
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exception? It sounds awfully like ignoring the Charter, or at the very least 
trying to implicitly amend it without following the actual amendment 
procedure laid down for altering the foundational document.89 And therein 
lays the great difficulty with RTP and all other arguments for humanitarian 
intervention that involve crafting exceptions to Article 51: they weaken the 
Charter by suggesting that its provisions can be ignored when they are 
inconvenient. They undermine international law and its use-of-force 
framework because they craft ad hoc exceptions that run the risk that some 
members of the international community will start doing the same thing 
with the rest of the document as well. Weakening the basic structure of the 
UN Charter is a dangerous business. 
In contrast, the doctrine of legitimate defense works within the Charter 
by recognizing the absolute centrality of Article 51 for governance of use-
of-force questions. It accomplishes this task by offering a subtle reading of 
Article 51, carefully attuned to the natural law origins of defensive force 
and the positive law incorporation and preservation of that right into the 
text of Article 51. By working within the four corners of Article 51, the 
doctrine of legitimate defense strengthens—rather than weakens—the 
legitimacy of both Article 51 and the Charter as a whole.90 Granted, the 
doctrine of legitimate defense represents a vanguard interpretation of 
Article 51 out of step with current treatments of the issue in doctrinal 
treatises,91 but in many ways it offers a hermeneutical approach more 
carefully attuned to the text of Article 51 than other arguments regarding 
the use of force. These other, allegedly more “standard,” interpretations 
offer no explanation for why natural law should be excluded from the 
scope of the analysis when it is so explicitly referenced in the text of Article 
51. 
The doctrine of legitimate defense is also preferable to using the 
doctrine of necessity on which to ground humanitarian intervention. 
                                                                                                                      
collective enforcement based on the authorization of the Security Council. In other words, 
it would amount to an exception similar to that laid down in Article 51 of the Charter 
(self-defence).”). 
89. See U.N. Charter art. 108 (“Amendments to the present Charter shall come into 
force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of 
two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their 
respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, 
including all the permanent members of the Security Council.”). 
90. This point is also made in FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 27, at 134. 
91. See, e.g., JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 750–70 (8th ed. 2012). 
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Necessity is clearly a ground for excusing a State from responsibility for an 
internationally wrongful act.92 Belgium pled necessity before the ICJ when 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) sued Belgium for its participation in NATO-led 
bombings of Serbian targets.93 Belgian counsel argued that the doctrine of 
necessity permitted military intervention when necessary to stop 
widespread human rights abuses and atrocities against innocent civilians.94 
This implied a balancing approach: if the harm of intervention was 
outweighed by the greater harm avoided, then the intervention could be 
justified by necessity.95 Although the ICJ resolved the case on jurisdictional 
grounds and never reached the merits, it is doubtful that the Court would 
have accepted the argument. First, the necessity doctrine, on most 
accounts, requires that the State in question act in fulfillment of essential 
State interests, whereas in this case Belgium was acting to secure someone 
else’s interests. So necessity protects a State acting for selfish reasons, but 
not for altruistic or humanitarian reasons; therefore, it cannot serve as a 
ground for humanitarian intervention. But even if this doctrinal 
requirement were avoided, the greater problem with the doctrine of 
necessity is again its weakening of the Article 51 framework. By working 
from the outside, it suggests that Article 51 is subject to artificial and ad 
hoc exceptions, rather than doing the more difficult work of offering an 
interpretation that is internally consistent with the practice of humanitarian 
intervention. 
 
V. APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF LEGITIMATE DEFENSE 
 
The next task is to apply the doctrine sketched out in the previous parts by 
looking to concrete situations so as to identify the real impact of the 
doctrine of legitimate defense. The most prominent case of humanitarian 
intervention—the situation that arguably gave birth to the doctrine of the 
responsibility to protect—was the NATO intervention against Serbia in 
response to the civil war in the former Yugoslavia and, following that, 
                                                                                                                      
92. See Robert D. Sloane, On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State 
Responsibility, 106 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 447 (2012). 
93. See Oral Pleadings of Belgium, Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999 
I.C.J. Pleadings 15 (May 10, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/10 
5/4515.pdf (uncorrected translation). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. (“A state of necessity is the cause which justifies the violation of a binding rule 
in order to safeguard, in face of grave and imminent peril, values which are higher than 
those protected by the rule which has been breached.”). 
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reports of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. NATO forces bombed Serbia 
multiple times, the first in 1995 after atrocities were committed in Bosnia, 
and the second in 1999 after allegations of atrocities committed by pro-
Serbian forces in Kosovo. The bombing led to the withdrawal of Serbian 
forces from Kosovo, the introduction of United Nations peacekeepers into 
the region, the creation of a semi-autonomous government for Kosovo 
and eventually a unilateral claim of Kosovo independence. As discussed 
above, the military intervention, though widely celebrated (outside of 
Serbia), was not authorized by the Security Council and sparked collective 
handwringing over the legitimacy of the UN framework regarding the use 
of force. If the Charter prohibited NATO’s bombing campaign, and the 
action was morally justified, what does this say about international law? 
That international law is immoral? That is probably an exaggeration, but at 
the very least the situation opened up the possibility of a substantial gap 
between international law and morality.96 
The anxiety is understandable, but ultimately resolvable. As I now 
explain, the international law framework for the use of force, once properly 
understood, allowed for the NATO intervention against Kosovo. It was 
legal. And more importantly, it was legal according to Article 51. One need 
not appeal to some extra-legal claim regarding morality, or new exceptions to 
the Charter’s use-of-force regime. The seeds for justifying the Kosovo 
operation lay within the words of Article 51 itself. 
In the midst of a civil war, ethnic Albanian civilians in Kosovo were 
attacked by military forces operating either under the de jure or de facto 
                                                                                                                      
96. See David Wippman, Kosovo and the Limits of International Law, 25 FORDHAM 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 129, 130–31 (2001) (“These distinctive characteristics of 
the NATO intervention created an irresolvable tension between the formal law of the 
U.N. Charter and the actual practice of States whose conduct is central to international 
lawmaking. The breach of the Charter was clear and apparent. NATO did not seek or 
receive Security Council authorization, and it was not acting in self-defense. For many 
international lawyers, the analysis ends there. But simply labeling the intervention illegal is 
unsatisfactory. The authority of international law rests on a reasonable congruence 
between formally articulated norms and State behavior; when the two diverge too sharply, 
the former must adapt or lose their relevance. The scope of the Kosovo operation, the 
identity of the participants and the lack of a coherent legal rationale all combine to render 
it difficult to dismiss the intervention as an anomaly with no lasting impact on 
international law. But at the same time, the continuing disagreement within NATO and 
among States generally over the legitimacy and desirability of unauthorized humanitarian 
intervention make it difficult to discern any clear change or evolution in the law. The 
result is a persistent and disquieting uncertainty.”).  
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control of Serbia.97 The attacks targeted and killed not just Kosovo 
Liberation Army rebel forces in Kosovo, but also civilians. The ethnic 
Albanians of Kosovo are arguably a nation or people (Kosovars), or at the 
very least part of the Albanian nation.98 Although this fact is a sociological 
and ethnographic fact—as opposed to a legal fact—it is entirely plausible 
that the Kosovars constitute an ethnic group that is protected by the law. 
Indeed, they are protected by the law of genocide in the sense that an 
attack against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo designed to destroy their 
group in whole or in part (performed with genocidal intent) would 
constitute the crime of genocide.99 The group has the right to be free from 
existential destruction and that right is codified in the Genocide 
Convention. 
The most controversial application of my claim is that the ethnic 
Albanians had a right of legitimate defense once they were unlawfully 
attacked by Serbian forces. There are several ways of expressing this legal 
claim. First, one might put the point this way: the Kosovars constitute a 
legally protected people who have not only the right of self-determination, 
but also the more primary natural right to exist. When that right is 
threatened because they are militarily attacked, they have the right—under 
natural law—to exercise lawful self-defense on their own behalf. The fact 
that the Kosovars did not enjoy international statehood is no reason for 
denying them the right of self-defense. Statehood is a function of the 
international legal system, and the natural right to self-defense would apply 
even if there were no international legal system in operation. The natural 
right of self-defense is logically independent of statehood. If the Kosovars 
                                                                                                                      
97. See Prosecutor v. Šainović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Judgment (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014) (affirming convictions but reducing 
some sentences of Serbian officials responsible for Kosovo atrocities). For a discussion of 
this decision (including its discussion of the “specific direction” standard for aiding and 
abetting liability), see Marko Milanovic, The Self-Fragmentation of the ICTY Appeals Chamber, 
EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-self-fragmentation-of-the-icty-
appeals-chamber/. 
98. See Christopher J. Borgen, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination, 
Secession and Recognition, ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.asil.org/insights/vol 
ume/12/issue/2/kosovos-declaration-independence-self-determination-secession-and (“it 
remains an open question whether widespread support of Kosovo’s independence would 
signal a shift in the definition of ‘people’ so that the term no longer represents a complete 
ethnic nation but can be used to refer to a homogenous ethnic enclave within another 
nation”). 
99. For a description of the conflict, see SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM 
HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 443 (2002). 
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are attacked, they have the right to defend themselves to vindicate their 
right to exist. 
This is where the language of Article 51 comes into play. Because the 
Kosovars have the right to defend themselves against an unjust and 
unlawful attack, third-parties have the right to come to their aid through 
the exercise of defense of others. The conditions for lawful defense of 
others track the conditions for lawful self-defense. So if the Kosovars have 
a right of self-defense against an unjust attack, then NATO was necessarily 
permitted to intervene on their behalf. It is nonsensical to claim that 
someone has a right of self-defense but no one has a corresponding right 
to defend them. The two always go together.  
Article 51 vindicates this analysis. Its bare terms carve-out the natural 
right of légitime défense, a broader category of defensive force that includes 
both self-defense and defense of others in one omnibus justification. So 
NATO and its member States were permitted to engage in defensive force 
on behalf of Kosovo just as long as Kosovo had a natural right to defend 
itself. This is the essence of legitimate defense. Article 51 also imposes 
other restrictions though they were clearly satisfied in the Kosovo 
situation. The right of response is only triggered once an “attack” occurs. 
In the Kosovo case an attack certainly did occur, and it was a vicious and 
sustained one against the Kosovar people. Under natural law, the Kosovars 
have the right to exist and third parties have a natural law right to exercise 
legitimate defense on their behalf. NATO exercised that right.100 The result 
is that the existence of the Kosovar people was preserved. 
Putting the same point in terms that would have been comprehensible 
to the natural law theorists, every nation has a right of self-preservation. 
The United States, Belgium and other members of NATO each have the 
right to engage in self-preservation, and that right generates a 
corresponding duty as well. Both the right and duty attach not just to the 
bare fact of self-preservation in the existential sense, but also the right and 
duty to perfect their preservation. The natural law theorists were explicit that 
this generated a right of intervention, especially when other States were 
                                                                                                                      
100. See Steven Erlanger, NATO Was Closer to Ground War in Kosovo than is Widely 
Realized, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 6, 1999, § 1, at 6, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/1999/11/07/world/nato-was-closer-to-ground-war-in-kosovo-than-is-widely-realized.ht 
ml (noting that Tony Blair was preparing to officially activate thirty thousand British 
reservists so as to send fifty thousand troops into battle in Kosovo). President Clinton was 
also making preparations for a ground invasion with an additional one hundred twenty 
thousand American troops. Id. 
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being obstinate and failing to perfect their own right of preservation.101 
This point naturally applies to the coordinated international intervention 
against Serbia. As Lauterpacht and Oppenheim put the point, interventions 
to perfect the right of preservation were justified to force a State to comply 
with its international obligations.102 Since Serbian forces were violating 
international obligations by systematically killing civilians and violating 
other provisions of international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law, the international community was justified under international 
law in intervening in order to rectify this malfeasance.  
One might object that some of these Serbian actions were not, strictly 
speaking, violations of international law at the time that the natural law 
theorists were writing. Neither international humanitarian law nor 
international human rights law existed in their current manifestations, 
though the laws and customs of war are of ancient vintage and certainly 
existed (and were extensively discussed by the natural law theorists). The 
idea that is so important to human rights law—that a sovereign’s treatment 
of its own citizens is a matter of international concern—is a recent 
development in the history of human rights and international law.103 The 
modern-day “thinness” of sovereignty is a post-World War II 
development. 
There are two answers to this objection. First, the history is not entirely 
accurate. Yes, the birth of human rights law after World War II ended a 
period of strong sovereignty embodied in the Westphalian order.104 
However, the story is not so simple. It is more accurate to say that 
sovereignty has waxed and waned over the years, moving through periods 
and phases where individual States received greater or lesser degrees of 
insulation from outside “interference” and intervention. There was a time, 
for example, when outside intervention from third States was more 
common than it is now because the right to engage in warfare was not 
completely restricted. Second, the exact nature of the international law 
violations committed by the host States is irrelevant. The key point is that 
the natural law theorists believed in a right of intervention, based on self-
                                                                                                                      
101. See supra notes 38–45  and accompanying text (discussing Vattel). 
102. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text. 
103. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990). 
104. For a discussion, see Benjamin N. Schiff, Universalism Meets Sovereignty at the 
International Criminal Court, in NEGOTIATING SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
ACTORS AND ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY HUMAN RIGHTS POLITICS 59 (Michaelene Cox 
& Noha Shawki eds., 2009). 
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preservation, to deal with recalcitrant States that refused to obey their 
international obligations. The content of those international obligations is 
mostly irrelevant for the argument. What matters is that natural law 
recognized that right of intervention when necessary to perfect the right of 
self-preservation, and the exact content of the international legal norms 
violated by the offending State is not material to the right of intervention 
triggered by their violation. The fact that Serbia violated human rights 
norms that only crystallized after World War II should not matter to the 
analysis.  
Having considered a situation where the doctrine of legitimate defense 
justifies intervention (Kosovo), we should now consider a baseline—a 
realtime scenario where intervention is not justified by the doctrine. The 
recent military excursions by Russia in Crimea and eastern Ukraine provide 
an excellent example.  
Russian troops covertly entered Crimea and, without wearing 
identifying insignia, took control of key installations on the Ukrainian-
controlled territory.105 Presumably the Russians engaged in the pretext of 
anonymity because they wanted to preserve the option of classifying the 
deployed battalions as homegrown, Russian-speaking militias from Crimea 
(rather than an outside military force).106 This strategy never came to 
fruition because the world saw the troops for what they were—forces 
dispatched by the Kremlin. Although the government of Ukraine—and 
foreign powers—complained about the Russian annexation of Crimea, no 
one was willing to go to war with Russia over the peninsula. Ukraine 
eventually ceded de facto control over the territory to Russia.107 
                                                                                                                      
105. See Andrew Higgins, Amid More Signs of Russian Force in Crimea, Delight Mixes with 
Dismay, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 2, 2014, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2014/03/02/world/europe/tensions-rise-in-crimean-capital-as-armed-men-continue-to-
take-up-posts.html?_r=0. 
106. Id. (“None of the heavily armed soldiers had insignia on their green combat 
uniforms, and for days, Russia insisted that it was just a spectator to the dramatic events 
unfolding in the Ukrainian region of Crimea and was as puzzled as everyone else by the 
identities of masked gunmen who had seized Crimea’s two main airports and its 
Parliament and main government office buildings.”). 
107. See David M. Herszenhorn & Andrew E. Kramer, Ukraine Plans to Withdraw 
Troops From Russia-Occupied Crimea, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 19, 2014, at A14, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/world/europe/crimea.html (“While the 
provisional government in Kiev has insisted that Russia’s annexation of Crimea is illegal 
and has appealed to international supporters for help, the evacuation announcement by 
the head of the national security council, Andriy Parubiy, effectively amounted to a 
surrender of Crimea, at least from a military standpoint.”). 
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Was the Russian intervention in Crimea an exercise of legitimate 
defense? Arguably not, but not because of the usual reason, i.e., the 
intervention came from an outside source. Rather, the doctrine of 
legitimate defense fails to justify intervention in this case because the 
Russian-speaking Crimean people were never attacked. They were not 
subject to widespread or systematic human rights abuses, they were not 
subject to crimes against humanity or other forms of ethnic cleansing, and 
they were not victimized by an attempted genocide. Their right to existence 
was never threatened and, consequently, their right of self-preservation, 
and the need to use defensive force, was never triggered. Because the 
Crimeans themselves had no right to use defensive force on their behalf, 
there was no corresponding legitimate defense (defense of others) that 
could be exercised by the Russian military forces from Moscow. Whether 
the Crimeans had a right of self-determination that was not fulfilled by 
their existing arrangement within Ukraine is a separate question and not 
one that is properly addressed in this essay. It should be noted, however, 
that although the Russian-speaking Crimeans arguably have a right of self-
determination, their internal political arrangement with Ukraine permitted 
them a strong amount of regional autonomy, such that it is probable that 
their right of internal self-determination was protected before the Russian 
annexation of their territory. A similar analysis applies to the Russian-
speaking population of eastern Ukraine. Although this region of Ukraine 
does not enjoy the regional autonomy that the local government of Crimea 
enjoyed, it is nonetheless important to note that the ethnic Russians in 
eastern Ukraine were neither attacked nor suffered an existential threat that 
would have triggered a right of response—and a corresponding right of 
intervention by third parties—under the doctrine of legitimate defense. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The doctrine of legitimate defense will inevitably be criticized from both 
sides of the spectrum. Traditional advocates for robust restrictions on the 
use of force will complain that it licenses too much intervention, potentially 
destabilizing the world community,108 and that the doctrine could be cited 
                                                                                                                      
108 For a discussion of the tension between “balancers” and “bright-liners,” see 
Matthew C. Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: Form and Substance of the UN Charter Regime, 
24 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 151, 157 (2013) (“While giving broad 
discretion to the UN Security Council—a process that although internally quite 
unconstrained can yield clear directives—Bright-Liners generally argue that any use of 
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as a pretext for military interventions that are motivated by ulterior 
concerns. Also, legal positivists will complain that the doctrine strays from 
the established reading of the text of Article 51 and is unmoored from 
traditional sources of public international law because natural law is not an 
acceptable source of law. On the other end of the spectrum, advocates for 
humanitarian intervention will complain that the doctrine of legitimate 
defense is too timid because it does not justify interventions in situations 
(including humanitarian disasters) that do not involve military attacks or 
existential threats that trigger the right of self-preservation. The answer to 
both sides of the spectrum is exactly the same. The doctrine of legitimate 
defense is not an example of wishful thinking; its content cannot be 
dreamed up based on desire alone. Its content is provided by natural law 
and the bare text of Article 51, which incorporates natural law by reference 
and carves out its content from the Article 2 prohibition on the use of 
force. Most importantly, the fact that the doctrine does not justify all 
interventions is a virtue of the theory—not a vice. It would be better to 
defend a legal doctrine that is justified by the current state of the law, and a 
close reading of its foundational treaty and its relevant provisions, rather 
than make up a panicky and expansive doctrine designed only to fill the 
gaps of the current law identified by our moral intuition.  
 
 
                                                                                                                      
force beyond that authorized by the UN Security Council should be regulated by sharp 
lines, or rules that admit very little discretionary balancing by individual states (whether 
those contemplating or using force or those judging it).”). 
